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Editorial
Eight Recommendations for Maximizing the Return on Investment
in External Quality Oversight
In a previous editorial, Palmer addressed the evolving
impact of managed care on health care quality
management in the United States and concluded that a
meltdown was transpiring that represented a movement
away from strict external quality of care oversight toward
a paradigm of encouraging quality improvement through
professional and competitive incentives [1]. Whereas
many countries throughout the world may not have the
quality improvement benefits (and liabilities) of the
intense competition brought about by the evolution of
managed care [2], the US marketplace experience
provides the opportunity for consideration at an
international level of the value of external regulatory
oversight of quality of care. The purpose of this editorial
is to consider a conceptual framework for an economic
evaluation of external quality oversight to stimulate
thinking at an international level regarding the return
on investment of resources allocated to external quality
oversight. These comments will be framed in reference to
the largest external quality oversight effort in the US, the
Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) Health
Care Quality Improvement Program (HCQIP) [3-5] that
currently allocates in excess of $220 million per year from
US taxpayers for 37 million Medicare beneficiaries who
are the subject of the quality improvement efforts of the
peer review organization (PRO) program. There is
considerable uncertainty regarding the return on this
investment from any economic frame of reference,
including that of Medicare [4, 6,7]. This commentary
provides a definition of quality of care that incorporates
the conditions of perfect competition and concludes with
eight recommendations that may be robust on an
international basis with respect to maximizing the
return on investment of resources in external quality
oversight programs.
DEFINING QUALITY OF CARE
Identifying the implications and operation of an ideal
market for health care services using the paradigm of
perfect competition may inform an evaluation of the
return on investment in health care quality assurance
efforts, such as the HCQIP. Under perfect competition,
the quality of care would be optimal (or, if not optimal,
dynamically self-adjusting toward the optimum) if the
following four conditions prevailed in the market for
health services [8]:
(1) large numbers of buyers and sellers,
(2) free mobility of resources,
(3) undifferentiated products, and
(4) symmetric information among buyers and sellers.
The market for health care services is remarkable in
that all four of these assumptions of the perfectly
competitive paradigm may fail. However, the condition
that is most critical to the study of quality of care, and the
one that may be driving the overall structure of the
market for health care services (thereby causing the
failure of the other three assumptions), is the fourth
condition, symmetric information among buyers and
sellers [9]. The market failure that results from the
inability of consumers of health care services to assess
the quality of care accurately is the economic justification
for the licensure of health care providers [10]. Profes-
sional licensure, with its attendant limitation on the
number of providers and mobility of resources, repre-
sents a further deviation from the paradigm of perfect
competition.
The inability of consumers of health care to assess the
quality of care accurately also sets up a principal-agent
relationship between the consumer and the provider. As
agents for the consumer, providers recommend, dispense
and evaluate the quality of health care services. Opti-
mally, the providers (as agents for the consumers)
recommend and dispense the type and level of health
services that the consumer would choose had the
consumer been appropriately informed about the efficacy
and quality of the available services. Since a provider may
have a self-interest in some of the health care services
required by the consumer, an imperfect agency develops
between the consumer and the provider, and the
consumer may not be offered the services that he would
otherwise choose had he been fully informed. This
imperfect agency results in efficiency losses in terms of
variations in both the quality and quantity of care
provided (the small area variations phenomenon). How-
ever, the professionalism of the provider and various
external and internal quality assurance programs keep
the self-interest of the provider from dominating the best
interests of the consumer.
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If the agency relationship between the consumer and
the health services provider was perfect, and in the
absence of other imperfections in any other relevant
markets, the quality of care received by the patient would
reflect the consumer's preference weighting for quality
health care in the face of other consumption alternatives.
This suggests that the definition of quality of care should
incorporate a reference to consumer preferences. By
considering the paradigm of a perfectly competitive
market for health services with perfect agency, we
would restate the US Institute of Medicine's definition
of quality of care in the following way [11]:
Quality of care is the degree to which health services for
individuals and populations are consistent with current
professional knowledge and reflect the preferences of
well-informed consumers with regard to the trade-off
between increasing desired health outcomes and reducing
other consumption alternatives.
This definition of quality of care has the added benefit
of focusing on consumer preferences; thus, it is consistent
with the philosophy of "focusing on the customer" that is
central to the total quality management/continuous
quality improvement approach to quality assurance. In
addition to perfect agency and its focus on consumer
preferences, the perfectly competitive market for health
care services would have four additional characteristics:
(1) there are few or no costs associated with operating the
mechanism (transactions costs are low); (2) the perfectly
competitive market is self-regulating and self-improving;
(3) strategic behavior on the part of an individual agent
is not beneficial to that agent; and (4) the mechanism is
not excessively burdensome to the agents who are
influenced.
THE HCQIP AS AN EXAMPLE OF
EXTERNAL QUALITY OVERSIGHT
The HCQIP is the fifth version of review or oversight
of the Medicare program. From its inception in 1965
through 1973, the Medicare program operated under no
formal external review mechanism. In 1973, the US
Congress enacted legislation to create the Professional
Standards Review Organizations (PSROs). From 1965
through 1983, Medicare reimbursed providers based on
billed charges. The role of the more than 200 regional
PSROs throughout the US and its territories was to
monitor providers in order to identify and control health
care providers who were possibly overutilizing resources.
In 1983, in response to an ongoing increase in costs that
was threatening the solvency of the Medicare program,
the US Congress changed the Medicare reimbursement
mechanism. Within the Tax Equity and Fiscal Respon-
sibility Act (TEFRA) of 1983, the Prospective Payment
System (PPS) was established. Under the PPS, hospitals
are reimbursed through a fixed payment that is based on
the patient's Diagnostic-Related Group (DRG), and
there is an incentive for providers to "undertreat" or
provide too few resources in the care of patients. To
counterbalance this problem, Congress reconstituted a
review of the Medicare program by establishing the
Physician Review Organizations (PROs). An external
review of the Medicare program was carried out by the
PROs through successive contracts, called the First,
Second, Third, and Fourth Scopes of Work [5]. PROs
are now engaged in the Fifth Scope of Work from 1996 to
1999 with a mandate to shift external oversight activities
from an exclusive focus on hospital care to addressing
quality of ambulatory care as well.
THE HCQEP COMPARED TO THE IDEAL
QUALITY ASSURANCE METHODOLOGY
Jencks and Wilensky defined the goal and immediate
objective of the HCQIP as follows: "to move from
dealing with individual clinical errors to helping provi-
ders to improve the mainstream of care," and to create a
situation in which "PROs will focus primarily on
persistent differences between the observed and the
achievable in both care and outcomes and less on
occasional, unusual deficiencies in care," respectively
[3]. This explicit goal and immediate objective do not
provide an obvious basis for an economic evaluation of
the HCQIP. The ideal quality assurance methodology
would attempt to restore those attributes of the perfectly
competitive paradigm that are lost as a result of the
market failure described in the previous section. The
following is an evaluation of the HCQIP from the
standpoint of each of the attributes of the perfectly
competitive paradigm.
Accounting for consumer preferences
Under our definition of quality of care, an ideal quality
assurance methodology would account explicitly for the
preferences of the well-informed consumer. Since the
HCQIP does not explicitly take into account the
preferences of consumers, it does not conform to the
ideal. Some HCQIP efforts are beginning to include the
role of consumer preferences, such as projects that focus
on the use of breast conserving therapy for breast cancer
patients.
Accounting for professional knowledge and judgment
The ideal quality assurance methodology would also
account for professional knowledge and judgment. The
HCQIP seems to conform to this ideal since the HCQIP
foresees using optimal clinical practice guidelines in an
attempt to shift and tighten the distribution of treatment
modalities around these optimal practice guidelines.
However, because competing practice guidelines are
available for the same medical conditions and treatment
interventions, we must evaluate the alternative guidelines
with regard to optimal patient outcomes. The guidelines
developed by medical subspecialties (as distinguished
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from those derived from multidisciplinary efforts) may
suffer from a conflict of interest similar to the one
previously described to explain the market failure that
results from asymmetric information [12].
Self-regulating and self-improving
The perfectly competitive market for health services
would be self-regulating and self-improving. That is, any
provider of health services that does not provide a
sufficiently high quality of care would be driven out of
the market by superior competitors, and investment in
new improved techniques and technologies would be
rewarded, and quickly adopted, to gain competitive
advantage. Although the HCQIP is not self-regulating,
it does require the specific and ongoing intervention of
HCFA to remain in place, and it does have the potential
to be self-improving. The cooperative improvement
projects with the PROs that are being developed through
the HCQIP could provide competitive advantages to
those providers who are quick to assimilate successful
initiatives. This could also result in residual benefits to
health care consumers beyond the Medicare program. It
may carry some degree of risk to those providers who do
not effectively take up successful initiatives, as these
providers may begin to lose patients to "higher quality"
providers. One economic criterion for evaluating the
HCQDP is the extent to which the cooperative improve-
ment projects initiated under the HCQIP might provide
competitive advantages to the participating providers.
Benefits from strategic behavior
Under the paradigm of perfect competition, agents or
consortia of agents cannot benefit in the market through
strategic behavior. It is unclear as to whether the HCQIP
is capable of countering strategic behaviors on the part of
consumers, providers, or PROs. Clearly, the HCQIP
itself would be undermined by this type of behavior on
the part of PROs. One of the most obvious PRO strategic
behaviors would be the implementation of projects that
would be relatively easy to complete.
Invisibility of the intervention
The last characteristic of the perfectly competitive
paradigm that could be emulated by the HCQIP is that
it should not be excessively burdensome to the agents
being influenced. The perceived burden and intrusion of
the previous PRO review programs substantially influ-
enced the clinical community to press for a redesign of the
Medicare quality oversight methodology. The successful
implementation of the HCQIP has the potential to be
relatively invisible to the providers being influenced. If
the HCQIP cooperative projects can convincingly
improve medical practices and create competitive advan-
tages for cooperating providers, these providers are likely
to embrace the program.
MEASURING THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS
OF EXTERNAL QUALITY OVERSIGHT
Phelps and Mooney [13] provide important informa-
tion for measuring the cost-effectiveness of external
quality oversight in the United States. They have
developed an index to generate a dollar-valued welfare
loss that combines measures of resource use, the
coefficient of variation in use rates across regions, and
the rate at which the incremental value of a medical
treatment changes as its rate of use changes. The top 25
medical items in 1987 generated a total annual efficiency
loss of $7 billion, or approximately 15% of total health
care expenditure for that year. Given this analysis
(combined with the theoretical ideal quality assurance
and improvement mechanism), the most effective expen-
diture of resources for the HCQIP is likely to come out of
analyzing the effectiveness of PRO efforts with medical
interventions that generate the greatest welfare loss. It is
clear, for example, that HCFA made a good choice in
initiating the Cooperative Cardiovascular Project (CCP),
as it addresses three of the top five items on the Phelps
and Mooney list [3,13].
We believe that investment in external health care
quality oversight should consider the four characteristics
of the paradigm of perfect competition. In order to
implement this concept, we recommend that this invest-
ment be directed toward initiatives that incorporate the
following items into their project design:
(1) A cost-accounting of each of the individual
projects.
(2) Review and discussion of consumer preferences as
they relate to the specific topic.
(3) Review and discussion of the clinical guidelines
that pertain to the specific topic, with particular attention
to any competing guidelines that may be present (i.e.
subspecialty vs multispecialty guidelines).
(4) Attention and concern for strategic behaviors that
may undermine the goals of the individual projects.
(5) Minimization of the burden of the project on the
various participants.
(6) Selection of projects based on the list of conditions
or health care interventions that are associated with the
largest efficiency losses in the particular population that
is the setting for the project.
(7) Implementation of projects in an experimental
manner, ideally with random allocation, so that the
effects of the quality oversight intervention can be
disentangled from secular trends and to ensure that
confounding factors are distributed by chance [14].
(8) Cost-effectiveness assessment of each project.
Returning to the framework provided by Palmer [1], as
the value of the various layers and components of
external health care quality management oversight are
considered by governments and other health care funders
throughout the world, we can all benefit from reflecting
on the advice of White, "Have a little bit of statistical
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[and economic] compassion and take a look at the
quantitative information before providing inadequate
care or wasting millions of dollars" [15].
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